Introduction
Income contingent loans (ICL) have become a generic policy design following the innovative development of the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) by the Australian Government some 25 years ago. While the basic idea has a long history (for example Friedman, 1955) , and there have been many papers analysing both implementation and impact, formal analysis of the policy category has remained elusive and its distinction from other transfer mechanisms not clearly understood.
In trying to identify which specific characteristics of an ICL make it different from other policies and products it is worth discussing broader resource contingent, or even event-contingent transfers, which might, for example, take account of wealth as well as income (we call this broader category a resource contingent loan [RCL] ). In doing so, it becomes evident that other existing policies can serve as examples of an RCL, with similar mechanisms and design considerations despite features that are different from those implied by the use of the terms 'income' and 'loan '. In what follows we use Australian policies and policy proposals directed towards the country's ageing demographic to illustrate how the idea of an RCL is more general than might be thought at first sight. The Age Pension, and the proposal to use housing equity drawdown to finance aged care (a kind of reverse mortgage), are two policy paradigms that fit the pattern of an RCL. The emphasis on age-related programs is deliberate -demographic change implies increasing public expenditure relative to GDP -and policy designs which work to contain these outlays will become increasingly important as populations age. Australia's Age Pension provides transfers contingent on income and assets means tests. Once access age is reached, all residents receive a pension subject to means tests. Recent aged care funding proposals in Australia involve a resource test and the likelihood of a forced sale of or the reverse mortgage of an individual's house.
Below, we summarise the key concepts related to RCLs and demonstrate how these can also apply to the Age Pension. We then examine how reverse mortgage type arrangements for financing aged care (long term care) would work as an RCL. Finally, we speculate on how the introduction of heterogeneous preferences may be germane to any formal analysis, and may change results. 
Conceptual framework
Direct government intervention in financing household needs can take two general forms 2 (see Figure 15 .1). Government transfers can act as a grant or subsidy on the one hand or as a resource contingent loan on the other. The rationale for intervention in the form of a subsidy or grant is usually based on equity considerations. Rationale for government financing where a repayment of the initial transfer is required can be made on both equity and economic efficiency grounds. Whenever the government employs a resource test alongside a payment it is effectively operating an RCL -a transfer is offered but taken away as the recipient has access to some threshold level of private resources.
The following sections discuss the similarities and differences between standard ICLs, means-tested pensions, and aged care related reverse mortgages with reference to this framework.
